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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DYLE E. STONE, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
HURST LUMBER COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts stated most favorable in favor of the 
plaintiff are as follows : 
On 12 June 1962, Dyle Stone was a carpenter fore-
man engraged in the construction of two homes in North 
Ogden, Utah, Tr. 13. On that morning a truck driver 
for Hurst Lumber Company delivered a load of lumber 
to that job. He was requested by Mr. Stone to drop it in 
two piles and the truck driver protested doing so. Mr. 
Stone then asked that the lumber be tied down so that 
it would not scatter and be damaged. He dumped so 
that it scattered over the ground, Tr. 15. When Stone 
protested, the truck driver grabbed him by one hand and 
hit him with his other hand. There had been no cursing 
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or improper language from Stone, Tr. 15-16. The 
truck driver had only been on the construction job one 
other time when Stone wasn't present, Tr. 20-21. 
Stone was taken to the emergency room in the 
Dee Hospital where he was seen by Dr. Drew Peterson, 
Tr. 36. He had abraisons, a cerebl'tal concussion. He 
still suffers from amnesia as to the events in litigation. 
He incurred a hospital bill of Forty and noj100 ($40.00) 
Dollars, and a doctor's bill of Ninety and noj100 ($90.00) 
Dollars, Tr. 25. In addition, he lost a months wages in 
the amount of Five Hundred Seventy-seven and 50j100 
($577.50) Dollars. 
Ronald Stone, a brother of the plaintiff, was not 
present but upon learning of the events, went to the 
office of the defendant, Tr. 31, advised an agent of 
the defendant as to what had happened, Tr. 32. His 
response was "I will can him or fire him. He is kind 
of hot headed. I warned him before", Tr. 32. A short 
while later the driver came and at that time he as-
saulted Ronald Stone, Tr. 32. 
The plaintiff made no effort to offer character 
testimony about the defendant's driver. However, over 
the objection of the plaintiff, the defendant introduced 
testimony from five witnesses, Tr. 60-61, Tr. 63, Tr. 72, 
Tr. 78-79·, Tr. 102. Tr. 109, to the effect that its truck 
driver was meek, mild and a model of decorum. 
As a result of this testimony, which opened the door, 
the plaintiff introduced evidence that this driver was 
hot tempered, that he didn't get along with the men he 
worked with. That he was ready to fight anyone who 
teased him, Tr. 113. Further, the evidence showed 
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that truck drivers in construction tend to be quarrelsom 
and hard to get along with, Tr. 115, and that it is diffi-
cult to find ones that are not, Tr. 115. That it isn't 
u:q.common in the construction industry to find men who 
settle disputes with their fists, both on and off the 
job, Tr. 44, 46. 
From the evidence the jury could well find that 
the defendant's truck driver was one of a group that 
are inclined to be quarrelsom and that he was typical 
in that he was ready to fight. 
·The jury could well have found that this was known 
to the defendant who had been previously warned to 
control himself and that he didn't do so. That as a 
result the plaintiff was hurt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS SOME DIFFICULTY IN 
DETERMINING THE NATURE OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S ARGUME.NT ON THIS POINT. 
It is true that the plaintiff filed this action on two 
counts. 
1. Assault and battery occuring in the course of 
the man's employment. 
2. Negligence in employing a quarrelsom employee. 
The court denied the plaintiff's contention on the 
first point and refused to submit it to the jury. It is 
believed that this was erred because the ruling was 
based on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Barney 
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vs. Jewell Tea Contpany, 103 Utah 595, 139P(2) 878. 
Plaintiff has no quarrel with the courts ruling in 
the Jewell Tea Co. case. It conforms with the almost 
unanimous weight of authority throughout the country 
and is substantially within a rule set down in Restate-
ment of the Law of Agency, Second Edition, Section 
245, Illustrations 1 and 2. Almost without exception 
in cases where an employee is hired to make customer 
collection and to report hack to his emplyer, the courts 
have found that the employer is not liable for any battery 
or force used by the agent. This is exactly the Jewell 
Tea Case. However, it is submitted that the plaintiff 
has completely failed to understand the law relative to 
defendant's- first point. The plaintiff based his po-
sition on Section 245 of the Restatement, which provides 
as follows: 
"A master is subject to liability for the intended 
tortious harm by a servant to the person or 
things of another by an act done in connection 
with the servant's employment, although the act 
was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable 
in view of the duties of the servant." 
"a. Types of situations. Whether or not an em-
ployment involves, or is likely to lead to, the use 
of force against the person or property of another 
is a matter of fact to be decided by the trier of 
fact. Since opportunities and provocations arise 
in a great variety of ways, no attempt is made 
to make an exhaustive category of situations in 
which the master may be found liable. However, 
certain situations recur with sufficient frequency 
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to call for mention. These occur when the serv-
ant: (c) engages in a fight arising out of a 
dispute connected with his work for his employer. 
In all of these situations the ·liability of the prin-
cipal depends fundamentally upon the likelihood 
of a battery or other tort in view of the kind of 
result to be accomplished, the customs of the 
enterprise and the nature of the persons nor-
mally employed for doing the work." 
This case is clearly a case where a dispute arose 
out of the mans work for his employer. The truck driver, 
a man of quarrelsom tendency objected to an entirely 
proper request for handling of a delivery and this 
caused an altercration. The facts are almost exactly 
in point with the case of Carr vs. Crowell, Cal. 171 P 
(2) 5, which was heard some three or four years after 
the Jewel Tea Company decision. In th1s particular-
case a dispute arose between a general building con-
tractor employee and a subcontractor employee, which 
resulted in an altercration and assault, which resulted 
when the firm employee threw a hammer at the em-
ployee and struck him in the head and seriously injured 
him. The Supreme Court of California had no difficulty 
in finding for the plaintiff. 
"It is settled that an employer is liable for wilful 
and malicious torts of his employee committed 
in the scope of the employment." 
· "Defendant contends that Enloe was not acting 
in the scope of his employment when he injured 
plaintiff, on the grounds that the throwing of the 
hammer did not further defendant's interests 
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as an employer and that Enloe could not have in-
tended by his conduct to further such interests. 
It is sufficient, however, if the injury resulted 
from a dispute arising out of the employment. 
Under the provisions of section 2338 of the Civil 
Code a principal is liable for 'wrongful acts' of 
his agent committed 'in and as a part of' the 
principal's business. 'It is not necessary that 
the assault should have been made 'as a means, 
or for the purpose of performing the work he 
(the employee) was employed to do.' " 
"The employer's responsibility for the tortious 
conduct of his employee 'extends far beyond his 
actual or possible control over the conduct of 
the servant.. It rests n the broader ground that 
every man who prefers to manage his affairs 
through others remains bound to so manage them 
that third persons are not injured by any breach 
of legal duty on the part of such others' while 
acting in the scope of their employment." 
It is quite true that in the Jewell Tea case, the 
Supreme Court of Utah disputed from the California 
rule and on the facts of the Jewell Tea case it well should 
have. 
The Restatement of Agency is authority that this 
is within the scope of employment, just as it is authority 
for the support of the court ruling in Jewell Tea, supra. 
Similarly, other courts have come to the same conclusion, 
thus in Nelson vs. American-West Africa Line (2d Cir.) 
86 Federal (2) 730, the defendant was liable for all 
acts of a boatswain who struck a seaman for the purpose 
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of getting him to work. In Charles vs. Norfolk & West-
ern Ry. Co. (7th Cir.) 188 Federal 691, the railroad was 
held liable for the act of a conductor who assaulted a 
passenger. In Knight Iron & Metal Co. vs. Ardis} 240 
Ala. 305, 199 So. 712, the employer was held liable for 
the act of a salesman using a pistol during the strike 
for the protection of other employees. In Schultz vs. 
Purselfs Inc. 320 Mass. 579, 70 N.E. (2) 526, the man-
ager of a resturant caused the plaintiff who was falsely 
accused of disturbing the peace to suffer a beating. 
His employer was found liable. In Texas, in the Felder 
vs. Huston Transit Co. 203 SW (2) 831, the employer 
was found liable for an assault solely because the plain-
tiff :wouldn't give his name. See also Brocco vs. Arro 
Sportswear Co. 154 NYS (2) 348. 
It is believed that the staten1ents of the above cases 
may best be summarized by the statements to be found 
in the Restatement of Agency Comment "I" as follows: 
"Fights following arguments. Although a serv-
ant is employed in a matter not involving the 
use of force, he may nevertheless cause the master 
to be liable for its use if he is in a position 
which requires contacts with third persons under 
circumstances likely to lead to disputes. In de-
termining whether such conduct is in the scope of 
employment, the tendency of those engaged in 
that kind of work to settle disputes between 
them by the use of force is an important matter." 
In this case testimony was introduced to the effect 
that truck drivers in and about the construction industry 
are generally found to be quarrelsom, are frequently 
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apt to settle disputes with their fists, both on and off 
the job and although this testimony was disputed, a 
jury had a right to believe that this was in fact true 
and that the agent of the defendant fell within that cata-
gory. As a result, it is submitted that this case falls 
within the purview of this group of cases which the 
Supreme Court in Utah did not have before it in the 
Jewell Tea case and that the defendant could and should 
have been held liable for a battery committed within 
the scope of the defendants agent employment. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRE1D IN THAT THERE W.AS 
NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE QUESTION OF NEGLI-
GENCE TO BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY. 
The defendant's statement of the law as set forth 
in his brief is in substance correct. However, it is be-
lieved that the rule is better set forth in Restatement 
of Law Agent Section 213: 
"A person conducting an activity through serv-
ants or other agents is subject to liability for 
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent 
or reckless : 
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or 
in failing to make proper regulations; or 
(b) in the employment of improper persons or 
instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm 
to others." 
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Comment "d" provides: 
"d. Agent dangerous. The principal may be negli-
gent because he has reason to know that the 
servant or other agent, because of his qualities, 
is likely to harm others in view of the work or 
instrumentalities entrusted to him. If the danger-
ous quality fo the agent caused harm, the princi-
pal may be liable under the rule that one initiating 
conduct having an undue tendency to cause harm 
is liable therefor. See the Restatement of Torts, 
*308. 
The dangerous quality in the agent may consist 
of his incompetence or unskillfulness due to his 
youth or his lack of experience with reference 
to the act to be performed. An agent, although 
otherwise competent, may be incompetent because 
of his reckless or vicious disposition, and if a 
principal, without exercising due care in select-
ion, employs a vicious person to do an act which 
necessarily brings him in contact with others 
while in the performance of a duty, he is subject 
to liability for harm caused by the vicious pro-
pensity. The negligence may be in entrusting 
an agent with instrumentalities which, in con-
nection with his known propensities and the 
qualities of the instrumentalities constitute an 
undue risk to third persons. These propensities 
may be either viciousness, thoughtlessness, or 
playfulness." 
The rule is further found in Section 245, Comment "g": 
"g. Non-delegable duties and dangerous servants. 
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If the servant commits an assault or battery in a 
spirit of play or wholly by way of revenge or 
other personal motive, the master may be liable 
because of his duty to protect the other, as stated 
in Section 214, or because he has negligently or 
unknowingly employed a servant having such pro-
pensities that he should have known that he was 
creating an undue chance of harm to third per-
sons by employing the servant or entrusting him 
with the instrumentality 1n question, as stated 
in Section 213." 
Here we have a man who comes from a group 
that the jury could well find to be undisputed, argu-
mentative, quarrelsom, that the agent was in fact in 
that class. It is not denied that without any provo-
cation, he struck the plaintiff causing amnesia, and 
inability to work for 30 days and,One Hundred Twenty-
one and noj100 ($121.00) Dollars worth of doctor and 
hospital bills. That he was in fact dangerous cannot 
be and is not denied. T4e only question was not 
whether the agen~ was dangerous but whether the de-
fendant had knowledge of that point. It is submitted 
that actual proof of the knowledge was demonstrated 
in two counts, one directly, and second indirectly: 
1. The evidence was that the supervisor of the 
truck driver knew that he was hot headed. He had 
warned him that there would be a demonstration of his 
temper. How could this knowledge be acquired and 
why would there have been any necessity to issue a 
warning~ What was that warning~ It is respectfully 
submitted that that warning was that if he didn't control 
his temper he would be discharged. Why~ The answer 
10 
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to this is supplied sin1ply by the fact that without any 
inquiry as whether or not the employee was right or 
actually without any effort to determine what if any 
reason existed or any of the fairness that every Ameri-
can citizen is entitled to he was summarily discharged. 
This only makes sense in the case of a known offender 
who had gone once to often to the well. 
2. The indirect testimony is to the effect that this 
man was a known quarrelsom individual who could not 
get along with his fellow employees, who was willing 
to fight at the drop of a hat and would not take need-
ling or teasing. He was the type of man that one 
could and would ordinarily expect to do the act that 
caused the violence to the plaintiff. True, it is that 
the employer and all of its employees testified as to the 
sweet nature of this man but no testimony was offered 
from any other source that verified the reason as to 
his nature, reputation and character. 
The defendant quoted at length from Murray vs. 
Modoc State Bank) 181 Kan. 642, 313 P2 309 (1957). 
However, an examination of the facts involved did not 
permit the interpretation given by the defendant. It is 
correct that the plaintiff has been threatened and that 
some overt act in the matter of assault had been com-
mitted upon him, that no injury had ever been received 
by the plaintiff until the offense involved. It is not 
the law that to put an employer on notice there has to 
be a second battery of the injured person, similar to 
the doctrine that every dog is entitled to two bites. The 
law does not require the plaintiff to produce evidence 
of a prior assault. The law only requires that the man 
11 
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have the propensities for such action and that the 
employer knew or should have known thereof. In this 
case we are not concerned with what the employer 
should have known, the defendant admitted its know-
ledge of his temper and of his disposition. It had the 
duty then to act to protect its customers and general 
public. When it failed to do so, it voluntarily 
exposed others to the risk of its employee's hot temper 
by giving its agent another chance after a warning, it 
unnecessarily, unreasonably and negligently exposed 
someone, in this case the plaintiff, to the risk of serious 
injury. The jury found that this is what happened and 
that the defendant did have prior knowledge of the 
character and nature of its agent and that in permitting 
him to work that it did in fact expose the plaintiff to an 
unreasonable risk and harm. The trial court so in-
structed the jury: 
"Before you can return a verdict for the plain-
tiff, you must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that each of the following propositions 
are true: 
That the defendant company was negligent in 
that it 
A) Had an employee that was "dangerous" to 
the public when employed as a delivery-
man. By "dangerous" is meant that he was 
inclined to violence; because, he habitually 
lost his temper or habitually deliberately 
inflicted violence on others, or because if a 
combination of a tendency toward loss of 
temper and deliberate violence. 
12 
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B) That said employee's tendency to violence 
was of such a magnitude that a reasonably 
prudent employer knowing of such tendency 
and using ordinary care for the safety of 
his business contacts would not employ him 
as a deliveryman. 
C) That the defendant company either knew of 
such a tendency in that magnitude or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have known 
of it. 
Proposition No. 2: 
That the said negligence of the defendant, if any, 
was the proximate cause of the injury. That is, 
it was reasonably foreseable that the delivery-
man might eventually get into a dispute concern-
ing deliveries of supplies and strike someone 
and that said event did in fact occur. 
If you find that the two foregoing propositions 
are true, you should determine the damages 
sustained by the plaintiff according to the in-
structions hereinafter given to you on that sub-
ject." 
The defendant did not object to the accuracy of 
the above statement of law and by its own citation it 
was in no position to do so. Its position is that there 
was not sufficient evidence of what the jury found to 
be facts because their testimony was contradictory. This 
is not the basis for an appeal because in every trial 
there is a dispute of the facts. The very function of a 
jury trial is to have a group of citizens detennine what 
13 
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the facts are. This was done in this case and the de-
fendant is in no better position to dispute that finding 
than would be the plaintiff had the jury found the facts 
against him and in accordance with the evidence of the 
defendant .. 
The other case that the plaintiff cites. Porter vs. 
Thompson, 357, Mo. 31, 206 SW (2) 512, was not decided 
by reason of lack of evidence of the vicious tendency 
of the agent, although the only evidence was that the 
employee on previous occasion had been rude and 
threatening. The court found that this was enough to 
find that the agent was in fact vicious but found for 
the defendant because the defendant did not know of 
these propensities and the plaintiff had failed in his 
proof relative to this issue. 
Here there is no problem about notice, the defend-
ant admitted its knowledge. 
POINT III AND IV. 
NO ARGUMENT IS MADE ON EITHER POINT 
III OR IV. NO CAsg IS CITED IN FA-VOR OF 
EITHER POINT III OR IV IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
BRIEF. 
The law generally in case of assault is found in 
Jones on Evidence, page 257. "In all similar actions, 
the fact or repudiation of all parties is deemed by the 
law to be irrevelant in determining the merits of the 
controversy* * * Character evidence is held to be irreve-
lant to the issues presented in cases of assault and 
battery." 
14 
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The plaintiff's case adhered to this rule and did 
not offer any evidence of the character of the de-
fendant. On the contrary, an examination of the trans-
cript shows that the plaintiff carefully refrained from 
affirming such evidence. 
Notwithstanding that, the defendant introduced 
such evidence five times through five different witnesses 
and over the objection of the plaintiff. The defendant 
voluntarily introduced the evidence as to the nature and 
character of its employee. Assuming that the rule is 
as layed down, if the defendant voluntarily ignored the 
rule, it waived its application to the case. It cannot 
now hide behind it when contrary evidence is intro-
duced. 
Actually the witnesses character and reputation in 
the sense here used are synonymous Jones on Evi-
dence: 
"The reputation of a man is the common report 
which others make about him, the talk about him 
which shows the opinion in which he is held in 
his community; and a witness who has not 
heard a person discussed or spoken of is not 
competent to testify to his good reputation. 
Clearly, too, character evidence must not be too 
remote in point of time." 
It is difficult to understand what the defendant is 
contending herein by reason of its silence on this sub-
ject, unless it is to argue the fact that the defendant 
changes ~is way of life as of a certain hour and day, 
somewhat in the nature of Lazarus, who arose from 
the dead. This is not the law, has not been and was not 
15 
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the law and the defendant has cited not one case to 
support the contention to the contrary. 
It is submitted that this point fails first because 
the defendant has failed to meet the burden imposed 
upon it in the later, and second because there is no 
authority for such position. 
POINT V. 
THE DE1FENDANT IMPLIES THAT THE RULE 
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE NOT PERMIT-
TED IN THIS TYPE OF CASE. THIS POSITION 
IS CONTRARY TO THE RESTATEMENT, SEC-
TION 217 "c", SUBSECTION "b": 
"(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was 
reckless in employing him." 
"Punitative damages can properly be awarded 
against the master or other principal because 
of the act of the agent, because if, and only if, 
the agent was unfit and the principal was reck-
less in employing him." 
The jury found that this procedure was met. It is 
submitted that the evidence adequately supports that. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the defendant 1n its brief 
acknowledged the weakness of its position when it states 
at page 20, "The facts and evidence in this case are 
hard put to show negligence alone." 
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The ruling in Utah and elsewhere is that the 
jury verdict will be upheld if there is any competent 
evidence of the act to support that verdict. 
It is believed that the above statement concedes in 
fact, the consensus of that evidence. That is all that 
is necessary to sustain the action of the jury. 
We respectfully submit that the verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff as found by the jury and upheld by the 
trial court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATTERSON, FOLEY & PHILLIPS 
C. C. PATTERSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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